“The [Federal Open Market Committee] will continue to strike a balance between avoiding an overheating economy and bringing … price inflation to 2 percent on a sustained basis,” Chairman Jerome H. Powell said Congress as Fed chair.
The new Chairman of the Federal Reserve made his first testimony to Congress:
The Congress has assigned us the goals of promoting maximum employment and stable prices. Over the second half of 2017, the FOMC continued to gradually reduce monetary policy accommodation. Specifically, we raised the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point at our December meeting, bringing the target to a range of 1-1/4 to 1-1/2 percent. In addition, in October we initiated a balance sheet normalization program to gradually reduce the Federal Reserve’s securities holdings. That program has been proceeding smoothly. These interest rate and balance sheet actions reflect the Committee’s view that gradually reducing monetary policy accommodation will sustain a strong labor market while fostering a return of inflation to 2 percent.
n gauging the appropriate path for monetary policy over the next few years, the FOMC will continue to strike a balance between avoiding an overheated economy and bringing PCE price inflation to 2 percent on a sustained basis. While many factors shape the economic outlook, some of the headwinds the U.S. economy faced in previous years have turned into tailwinds: In particular, fiscal policy has become more stimulative and foreign demand for U.S. exports is on a firmer trajectory. Despite the recent volatility, financial conditions remain accommodative. At the same time, inflation remains below our 2 percent longer-run objective. In the FOMC’s view, further gradual increases in the federal funds rate will best promote attainment of both of our objectives. As always, the path of monetary policy will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.
In 2006 and 2007, we forecast the impending “great recession”. Our investment advice was to sell all your real estate. If you could not sell it, leverage it to the hilt (so you had your cash out before failure.)
Turned out to be an accurate forecast.
In 2017 and 2018, we are forecasting inflation and rising interest rates. Buy real estate now and lock-in your 30-year interest rates ASAP. [WARNING: Do not buy real estate on or near floodplain. See disclaimer below.] [WARNING: This paper was first published in 2018. Since that time the forecast has reached fruition. It is too late to beat rising interest rates.]
WHY?
* Quantitative Easing and the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was started during the height of the 2008 financial crisis. In essence, it allowed the Treasury to print money.
* In 2017 Donald Trump started enacting policies that mirrored his personal finances — borrow too much money and don’t plan on paying it back. Mr. Trump has been involved in 6 bankruptcies.
* When the government borrows lots of money without a payback plan, they compete with the private sector to borrow money resulting in a rise in interest rates. This phenomena is known as crowding out (economics). (1)
* President Trump bragged about wage inflation during his State Of The Union (SOTU) address. When wages go up without an increase in productivity, the prices of goods and services inflate.(2)
* “Make America Great Again” policies make the American dollar weak. Tariffs and trade protectionism undermine the value of the dollar and contribute to inflation. (3)
* President Trump replaced the Chairwoman of the Federal Reserve with a new chair who is not an economist. A first in U.S. history.
* Tax cuts without spending cuts result in a budget deficit. The nation’s debt is now bigger than its gross domestic product. Net interest payments on the debt are estimated to total $276.2 billion this fiscal year, or 6.8% of all federal outlays. The tax cuts are expected to make this payment explode.
* The Federal Reserves primary weapon for fighting inflation is to raise interest rates. (4)
You could say inflation and rising interest rates are a two-headed monster. When the government creates money, it is “inflationary.” The government fights inflation by raising interest rates. Rising interest rates exponentially increase the national debt. When the government borrows, it competes with consumer borrowing causing interest rates to rise.
The name given to the worst-case scenario is hyper-inflation. We don’t expect hyperinflation in the US in the near future; however, higher interest rates in the US will result in hyperinflation in other parts of the world. (See Part III below.)
WARNING: Do not buy real estate on or near floodplain.
Do not invest in real estate that is located near floodplain. Make sure your property has land ingress and egress from the closest 1,000-year-floodplain. Do not invest in any property located near a coast. Do not invest in a property that is below sea level. Do not invest in real estate located in Florida.
“Mostly stay away from the coasts because of both wind and rain issues from weather systems spinning inland. Even if you are not in a floodplain, a couple feet of rain in a day will cut off roads and overwhelm your sump pumps. Not to speak of wind taking power and telecom down.” — Sidd Mukerhjee (February 5, 2018)
NOTES
(1) “In economics, crowding out is argued by some economists to be a phenomenon that occurs when increased government involvement in a sector of the market economy substantially affects the remainder of the market, either on the supply or demand side of the market.
One type frequently discussed is when expansionary fiscal policy reduces investment spending by the private sector. The Government is “crowding out” investment because it is demanding more Loanable Funds and it is increasing interest rates from the borrowing, but that was broadened to multiple channels that might leave total output little changed or smaller.” — Olivier Jean Blanchard (2008) “crowding out,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract and Roger W. Spencer & William P. Yohe, 1970. “The ‘Crowding Out’ of Private Expenditures by Fiscal Policy Actions,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, October, pp. 12-24
(2) “After years of wage stagnation, we are finally seeing rising wages,” Donald Trump (State of the Union 2018)
“The Employment Cost Index, a measure of salary and benefit costs, registered a 2.6 percent gain for the full year, tied for the best since 2007.” — CNBC (January 31, 2018)
(3) “Recently, Trump levied steep tariffs on imported solar panel technology and washing machines, which immediately boosted prices for U.S. consumers.” — The Hill (February 6, 2018)
(4) “Federal Reserve officials followed through on an expected interest-rate increase and raised their forecast for economic growth in 2018, even as they stuck with a projection for three (rate) hikes in the coming year.
“This change highlights that the committee expects the labor market to remain strong, with sustained job creation, ample opportunities for workers and rising wages,” Chair Janet Yellen told reporters Wednesday in Washington following the decision. In her final scheduled press conference, Yellen noted that her nominated successor, Jerome Powell, has been part of the consensus shaping the Fed’s gradual rate-hike strategy.” — “Fed Raises Rates, Eyes Three 2018 Hikes as Yellen Era Nears End” (December 13, 2017)
Part II: Inflation Bites
In March of 2020, the global pandemic put the Fed on hold. Then, the Fed reversed course, did not increase rates, and did substantially more (trillions) quantitative easing (see chart below.) In addition, the federal government borrowed trillions of dollars with no repayment plan. A large portion of this money was given to consumers as stimulus. The consumers shifted the demand curve causing a sharp rise in prices. “A demand curve shift refers to fundamental changes in the balance of supply and demand that alter the quantity demanded at the same price,” says The Balance Economic Theory. Consumers continued to spend beyond their means raising consumer debt. “Household debt in the third quarter of 2022, increasing by $351 billion (2.2%) to $16.51 trillion. Balances now stand $2.36 trillion higher than at the end of 2019, before the pandemic recession,” as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
UPDATE: January 30, 2022
Inflation has hit 7% — the highest rate in 40 years.
The Fed has signaled that they are:
1) stopping quantitative easing in March
2) raising interest rates in March
Stopping quantitative easing means the Fed will no longer be supporting low Treasury yields by buying bonds. To date, they have bought over 8 trillion in Treasuries and other instruments that undercut interest rates. When the Fed stops buying Treasuries, the demand will go down and rates will go up.
Federal Reserve Balance Sheet 2022
The market has increased their forecast on the Fed raising rates to 4-5 times in 2022. When the Fed raises rates that banks charge each other, the banks charge you higher interest rates.
The 10 Year Treasury Note is the best indicator to watch for mortgage interest rates. It will reflect both the ending of quantitative easing and the increase in Fed funds rates. That is to say, if the Fed raises rates 1/4%, mortgage interest rates will likely rise 1/2%. That changes the forecast for mortgage rates in 2022 to rise 2 to 2.5%.
Borrow any long term money today before it is too late. [WARNING: This paper was first published in 2018. Since that time the forecast has reached fruition. It is too late to beat rising interest rates.] After rates rise for the next several years, there will be a recession. So, a long time before you may see conditions like we’ve had for the last 14 years.
10 Year Treasury Notes Interest Rates
Part III: U.S. Mass Consumption Results in Global Economic Disparity, Inequity, and Poverty
In Part I we mention the worst-case inflation scenario is hyper-inflation. We don’t expect hyperinflation in the US in the near future; however, higher interest rates in the US will result in hyperinflation in other parts of the world.
As long as the US Dollar is the world’s reserve currency, it is unlikely that the US will see hyperinflation. The US Congress defines the world’s reserve currency as, “a currency held by central banks in significant quantities. It is widely used to conduct international trade and financial transactions, eliminating the costs of settling transactions involving different currencies.”
When there is inflation in the US, the US Federal Reserve Bank raises interest rates. The rise in US interest rates results in other countries’ investors putting their money in dollar denominated US interest bearing investments. That is to say, foreign investors buy dollars with their home currencies. The result is a widened disparity in the exchange rates between the currencies. The US dollar increases in value and the foreign currency depreciates in value. There is a benefit to the US consumer — imported goods and services are cheaper. The disadvantage to the foreign countries is the dollar disparity causes a much greater rise in their domestic inflation as all their imports experience both the local inflation rate as well the inflation in buying dollars. In an even worse case scenario, the foreign country has debt that has to be repaid in dollars. In essence, their debt is multiplied by a factor equal to the decline in the value of their currency.
In September of 2022, the New York Times reported, “The Federal Reserve’s determination to crush inflation at home by raising interest rates is inflicting profound pain in other countries — pushing up prices, ballooning the size of debt payments and increasing the risk of a deep recession”
“Those interest rate increases are pumping up the value of the dollar — the go-to currency for much of the world’s trade and transactions — and causing economic turmoil in both rich and poor nations. In Britain and across much of the European continent, the dollar’s acceleration is helping feed stinging inflation.”
Weakening Currencies
Also in September of 2022, the Nikkei Asia reported, “Superstrong dollar threatens debt crisis across emerging economies. Mexico pressured to follow Fed hikes, while Sri Lanka’s repayment costs soar.”
In October of 2022, the IMF reported, “The dollar is at its highest level since 2000, having appreciated 22 percent against the yen, 13 percent against the Euro and 6 percent against emerging market currencies since the start of this year. Such a sharp strengthening of the dollar in a matter of months has sizable macroeconomic implications for almost all countries, given the dominance of the dollar in international trade and finance.”
Dollar Surge
Conclusion
The United States has unsustainable mass consumption. US consumers are destroying the world’s environment and economies. The excessive demand of US consumers has resulted in the exploitation of natural resources, the largest emissions of pollution and greenhouse gases, inflation, currency disparity, and the largest redistribution of wealth in the world. Americans’ mass consumption is responsible for creating the greatest income disparity, wealth inequity, and poverty.
The report is an authoritative assessment of the science of climate change, with a focus on the United States. It represents the first of two volumes of the Fourth National Climate Assessment, mandated by the Global Change Research Act of 1990.
The report’s summary states:
Global annually averaged surface air temperature has increased by about 1.8°F (1.0°C) over the last 115 years (1901–2016). This period is now the warmest in the history of modern civilization. The last few years have also seen record-breaking, climate-related weather extremes, and the last three years have been the warmest years on record for the globe. These trends are expected to continue over climate timescales.This assessment concludes, based on extensive evidence, that it is extremely likely that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.In addition to warming, many other aspects of global climate are changing, primarily in response to human activities. Thousands of studies conducted by researchers around the world have documented changes in surface, atmospheric, and oceanic temperatures; melting glaciers; diminishing snow cover; shrinking sea ice; rising sea levels; ocean acidification; and increasing atmospheric water vapor.
For example, global average sea level has risen by about 7–8 inches since 1900, with almost half (about 3 inches) of that rise occurring since 1993. Human-caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to this rise since 1900, contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800 years. Global sea level rise has already affected the United States; the incidence of daily tidal flooding is accelerating in more than 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities.
Global average sea levels are expected to continue to rise—by at least several inches in the next 15 years and by 1–4 feet by 2100. A rise of as much as 8 feet by 2100 cannot be ruled out. Sea level rise will be higher than the global average on the East and Gulf Coasts of the United States.
Changes in the characteristics of extreme events are particularly important for human safety, infrastructure, agriculture, water quality and quantity, and natural ecosystems. Heavy rainfall is increasing in intensity and frequency across the United States and globally and is expected to continue to increase. The largest observed changes in the United States have occurred in the Northeast.
Heatwaves have become more frequent in the United States since the 1960s, while extreme cold temperatures and cold waves are less frequent. Recent record-setting hot years are projected to become common in the near future for the United States, as annual average temperatures continue to rise. Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States has increased by 1.8°F (1.0°C) for the period 1901–2016; over the next few decades (2021–2050), annual average temperatures are expected to rise by about 2.5°F for the United States, relative to the recent past (average from 1976–2005), under all plausible future climate scenarios.
The incidence of large forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased since the early 1980s and is projected to further increase in those regions as the climate changes, with profound changes to regional ecosystems.
Annual trends toward earlier spring melt and reduced snowpack are already affecting water resources in the western United States and these trends are expected to continue. Under higher scenarios, and assuming no change to current water resources management, chronic, long-duration hydrological drought is increasingly possible before the end of this century.
The magnitude of climate change beyond the next few decades will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse gases (especially carbon dioxide) emitted globally. Without major reductions in emissions, the increase in annual average global temperature relative to preindustrial times could reach 9°F (5°C) or more by the end of this century. With significant reductions in emissions, the increase in annual average global temperature could be limited to 3.6°F (2°C) or less.
The global atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration has now passed 400 parts per million (ppm), a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when both global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today. Continued growth in CO2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens to hundreds of millions of years. There is broad consensus that the further and the faster the Earth system is pushed towards warming, the greater the risk of unanticipated changes and impacts, some of which are potentially large and irreversible.
The observed increase in carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent with higher emissions pathways. In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as economic growth became less carbon-intensive. Even if this slowing trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would limit global average temperature change to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels.
Introduction
New observations and new research have increased our understanding of past, current, and future climate change since the Third U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA3) was published in May 2014. This Climate Science Special Report (CSSR) is designed to capture that new information and build on the existing body of science in order to summarize the current state of knowledge and provide the scientific foundation for the Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4).
Since NCA3, stronger evidence has emerged for continuing, rapid, human-caused warming of the global atmosphere and ocean. This report concludes that “it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.”
The last few years have also seen record-breaking, climate-related weather extremes, the three warmest years on record for the globe, and continued decline in arctic sea ice. These trends are expected to continue in the future over climate (multidecadal) timescales. Significant advances have also been made in our understanding of extreme weather events and how they relate to increasing global temperatures and associated climate changes. Since 1980, the cost of extreme events for the United States has exceeded $1.1 trillion; therefore, better understanding of the frequency and severity of these events in the context of a changing climate is warranted.
Periodically taking stock of the current state of knowledge about climate change and putting new weather extremes, changes in sea ice, increases in ocean temperatures, and ocean acidification into context ensures that rigorous, scientifically-based information is available to inform dialogue and decisions at every level. This climate science report serves as the climate science foundation of the NCA4 and is generally intended for those who have a technical background in climate science. In this Executive Summary, green boxes present highlights of the main report. These are followed by related points and selected figures providing more scientific details. The summary material on each topic presents the most salient points of chapter findings and therefore represents only a subset of the report’s content. For more details, the reader is referred to the individual chapters. This report discusses climate trends and findings at several scales: global, nationwide for the United States, and for ten specific U.S. regions (shown in Figure 1 in the Guide to the Report). A statement of scientific confidence also follows each point in the Executive Summary. The confidence scale is described in the Guide to the Report. At the end of the Executive Summary and in Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate, there is also a summary box highlighting the most notable advances and topics since NCA3 and since the 2013 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report.
Global and U.S. Temperatures Continue to Rise
Long-term temperature observations are among the most consistent and widespread evidence of a warming planet. Temperature (and, above all, its local averages and extremes) affects agricultural productivity, energy use, human health, water resources, infrastructure, natural ecosystems, and many other essential aspects of society and the natural environment. Recent data add to the weight of evidence for rapid global-scale warming, the dominance of human causes, and the expected continuation of increasing temperatures, including more record-setting extremes. (Ch. 1)
Changes in Observed and Projected Global Temperature
Global annual average temperature (as calculated from instrumental records over both land and oceans) has increased by more than 1.2°F (0.65°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960; the linear regression change over the entire period from 1901–2016 is 1.8°F (1.0°C) (very high confidence; Fig. ES.1). Longer-term climate records over past centuries and millennia indicate that average temperatures in recent decades over much of the world have been much higher, and have risen faster during this time period than at any time in the past 1,700 years or more, the time period for which the global distribution of surface temperatures can be reconstructed (high confidence). (Ch. 1)
Figure 1
(left) Global annual average temperature has increased by more than 1.2°F (0.7°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960. Red bars show temperatures that were above the 1901–1960 average, and blue bars indicate temperatures below the average. (right) Surface temperature change (in °F) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960. Gray indicates missing data. From Figures 1.2. and 1.3 in Chapter 1.
Many lines of evidence demonstrate that it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. Over the last century, there are no convincing alternative explanations supported by the extent of the observational evidence. Solar output changes and internal natural variability can only contribute marginally to the observed changes in climate over the last century, and there is no convincing evidence for natural cycles in the observational record that could explain the observed changes in climate. (Very high confidence) (Ch. 1)
Figure 2
The likely range of the human contribution to the global mean temperature increase over the period 1951–2010 is 1.1° to 1.4°F (0.6° to 0.8°C), and the central estimate of the observed warming of 1.2°F (0.65°C) lies within this range (high confidence). This translates to a likely human contribution of 92%–123% of the observed 1951–2010 change. The likely contributions of natural forcing and internal variability to global temperature change over that period are minor (high confidence). (Ch. 3; Fig. ES.2)
Natural variability, including El Niño events and other recurring patterns of ocean–atmosphere interactions, impact temperature and precipitation, especially regionally, over timescales of months to years. The global influence of natural variability, however, is limited to a small fraction of observed climate trends over decades. (Very high confidence) (Ch. 1)
Global climate is projected to continue to change over this century and beyond. The magnitude of climate change beyond the next few decades will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse (heat-trapping) gases emitted globally and on the remaining uncertainty in the sensitivity of Earth’s climate to those emissions (very high confidence). With significant reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases, the global annually averaged temperature rise could be limited to 3.6°F (2°C) or less. Without major reductions in these emissions, the increase in annual average global temperatures relative to pre-industrial times could reach 9°F (5°C) or more by the end of this century. (Ch.1; Fig ES.3)
If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century relative to the last few decades (high confidence in continued warming, medium confidence in amount of warming. (Ch.4)
Figure 3
The two panels above show annual historical and a range of plausible future carbon emissions in units of gigatons of carbon (GtC) per year (left) and the historical observed and future temperature change that would result for a range of future scenarios relative to the 1901–1960 average, based on the central estimate (lines) and a range (shaded areas, two standard deviations) as simulated by the full suite of CMIP5 global climate models (right). By 2081–2100, the projected range in global mean temperature change is 1.1°–4.3°F under the even lower scenario (RCP2.6; 0.6°–2.4°C, green), 2.4°–5.9°F under the lower scenario (RCP4.5; 1.3°–3.3°C, blue), 3.0°–6.8°F under the mid-high scenario (RCP6.0; 1.6°–3.8°C, not shown) and 5.0°–10.2°F under the higher scenario (RCP8.5; 2.8°–5.7°C, orange). See the main report for more details on these scenarios and implications. Based on Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4.
Changes in Observed and Projected U.S. Temperature
Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States has increased by 1.2°F (0.7°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960 and by 1.8°F (1.0°C) based on a linear regression for the period 1901–2016 (very high confidence). Surface and satellite data are consistent in their depiction of rapid warming since 1979 (high confidence). Paleo-temperature evidence shows that recent decades are the warmest of the past 1,500 years (medium confidence). (Ch. 6)
Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States is projected to rise (very high confidence). Increases of about 2.5°F (1.4°C) are projected for the period 2021–2050 relative to the average from 1976–2005 in all RCP scenarios, implying recent record-setting years may be “common” in the next few decades (high confidence). Much larger rises are projected by late century (2071–2100): 2.8°–7.3°F (1.6°–4.1°C) in a lower scenario (RCP4.5) and 5.8°–11.9°F (3.2°–6.6°C) in a higher scenario (RCP8.5) (high confidence). (Ch. 6; Fig. ES.4)
In the United States, the urban heat island effect results in daytime temperatures 0.9°–7.2°F (0.5°–4.0°C) higher and nighttime temperatures 1.8°– 4.5°F (1.0°–2.5°C) higher in urban areas than in rural areas, with larger temperature differences in humid regions (primarily in the eastern United States) and in cities with larger and denser populations. The urban heat island effect will strengthen in the future as the structure and spatial extent as well as population density of urban areas change and grow (high confidence). (Ch. 10)
Figure 4
These maps show the projected changes in annual average temperatures for mid- and late-21st century for two future pathways. Changes are the differences between the average projected temperatures for mid-century (2036–2065; top), and late-century (2070-2099; bottom), and those observed for the near-present (1976–2005). See Figure 6.7 in Chapter 6 for more details.
Many Temperature and Precipitation Extremes Are Becoming More Common
Temperature and precipitation extremes can affect water quality and availability, agricultural productivity, human health, vital infrastructure, iconic ecosystems and species, and the likelihood of disasters. Some extremes have already become more frequent, intense, or of longer duration, and many extremes are expected to continue to increase or worsen, presenting substantial challenges for built, agricultural, and natural systems. Some storm types such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and winter storms are also exhibiting changes that have been linked to climate change, although the current state of the science does not yet permit detailed understanding.
Observed Changes in Extremes
Figure 5
The frequency of cold waves has decreased since the early 1900s, and the frequency of heat waves has increased since the mid-1960s (the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the peak period for extreme heat in the United States). (Very high confidence). (Ch. 6)
The frequency and intensity of extreme heat and heavy precipitation events are increasing in most continental regions of the world (very high confidence). These trends are consistent with expected physical responses to a warming climate. Climate model studies are also consistent with these trends, although models tend to underestimate the observed trends, especially for the increase in extreme precipitation events (very high confidence for temperature, high confidence for extreme precipitation). (Ch. 1)
Figure 6
These maps show the percentage change in several metrics of extreme precipitation by NCA4 region, including (upper left) the maximum daily precipitation in consecutive 5-year periods; (upper right) the amount of precipitation falling in daily events that exceed the 99th percentile of all non-zero precipitation days (top 1% of all daily precipitation events); (lower left) the number of 2-day events with a precipitation total exceeding the largest 2-day amount that is expected to occur, on average, only once every 5 years, as calculated over 1901–2016; and (lower right) the number of 2-day events with a precipitation total exceeding the largest 2-day amount that is expected to occur, on average, only once every 5 years, as calculated over 1958–2016. The number in each black circle is the percent change over the entire period, either 1901–2016 or 1958–2016. Note that Alaska and Hawai‘i are not included in the 1901–2016 maps owing to a lack of observations in the earlier part of the 20th century. (Figure source: CICS-NC / NOAA NCEI). Based on Figure 7.4 in Chapter 7.
Recent droughts and associated heat waves have reached record intensity in some regions of the United States; however, by geographical scale and duration, the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the benchmark drought and extreme heat event in the historical record. (Very high confidence) (Ch. 8)
Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover extent, North America maximum snow depth, snow water equivalent in the western United States, and extreme snowfall years in the southern and western United States have all declined, while extreme snowfall years in parts of the northern United States have increased. (Medium confidence). (Ch. 7)
There has been a trend toward earlier snowmelt and a decrease in snowstorm frequency on the southern margins of climatologically snowy areas (medium confidence). Winter storm tracks have shifted northward since 1950 over the Northern Hemisphere (medium confidence). Potential linkages between the frequency and intensity of severe winter storms in the United States and accelerated warming in the Arctic have been postulated, but they are complex, and, to some extent, contested, and confidence in the connection is currently low. (Ch. 9)
Tornado activity in the United States has become more variable, particularly over the 2000s, with a decrease in the number of days per year with tornadoes and an increase in the number of tornadoes on these days (medium confidence). Confidence in past trends for hail and severe thunderstorm winds, however, is low (Ch. 9)
Projected Changes in Extremes
The frequency and intensity of extreme high temperature events are virtually certain to increase in the future as global temperature increases (high confidence). Extreme precipitation events will very likely continue to increase in frequency and intensity throughout most of the world (high confidence). Observed and projected trends for some other types of extreme events, such as floods, droughts, and severe storms, have more variable regional characteristics. (Ch. 1)
Both extremely cold days and extremely warm days are expected to become warmer. Cold waves are predicted to become less intense while heat waves will become more intense. The number of days below freezing is projected to decline while the number above 90°F will rise. (Very high confidence) (Ch. 6)
The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events in the United States are projected to continue to increase over the 21st century (high confidence). There are, however, important regional and seasonal differences in projected changes in total precipitation: the northern United States, including Alaska, is projected to receive more precipitation in the winter and spring, and parts of the southwestern United States are projected to receive less precipitation in the winter and spring (medium confidence). (Ch. 7)
The frequency and severity of landfalling “atmospheric rivers” on the U.S. West Coast (narrow streams of moisture that account for 30%–40% of the typical snowpack and annual precipitation in the region and are associated with severe flooding events) will increase as a result of increasing evaporation and resulting higher atmospheric water vapor that occurs with increasing temperature. (Medium confidence) (Ch. 9)
Projections indicate large declines in snowpack in the western United States and shifts to more precipitation falling as rain than snow in the cold season in many parts of the central and eastern United States (high confidence). (Ch. 7)
Substantial reductions in western U.S. winter and spring snowpack are projected as the climate warms. Earlier spring melt and reduced snow water equivalent have been formally attributed to human-induced warming (high confidence) and will very likely be exacerbated as the climate continues to warm (very high confidence). Under higher scenarios, and assuming no change to current water resources management, chronic, long-duration hydrological drought is increasingly possible by the end of this century (very high confidence). (Ch. 8)
The human effect on recent major U.S. droughts is complicated. Little evidence is found for a human influence on observed precipitation deficits, but much evidence is found for a human influence on surface soil moisture deficits due to increased evapotranspiration caused by higher temperatures. (High confidence) (Ch. 8)
The incidence of large forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased since the early 1980s (high confidence) and is projected to further increase in those regions as the climate warms, with profound changes to certain ecosystems (medium confidence). (Ch. 8)
Both physics and numerical modeling simulations generally indicate an increase in tropical cyclone intensity in a warmer world, and the models generally show an increase in the number of very intense tropical cyclones. For Atlantic and eastern North Pacific hurricanes and western North Pacific typhoons, increases are projected in precipitation rates (high confidence) and intensity (medium confidence). The frequency of the most intense of these storms is projected to increase in the Atlantic and western North Pacific (low confidence) and in the eastern North Pacific (medium confidence). (Ch. 9)
Oceans Are Rising, Warming, and Becoming More Acidic
Oceans occupy two-thirds of the planet’s surface and host unique ecosystems and species, including those important for global commercial and subsistence fishing. Understanding climate impacts on the ocean and the ocean’s feedbacks to the climate system is critical for a comprehensive understanding of current and future changes in climate.
Global Ocean Heat
Ocean heat content has increased at all depths since the 1960s and surface waters have warmed by about 1.3° ± 0.1°F (0.7° ± 0.08°C) per century globally since 1900 to 2016. Under higher scenarios, a global increase in average sea surface temperature of 4.9° ± 1.3°F (2.7° ± 0.7°C) is projected by 2100. (Very high confidence). (Ch. 13)
Global and Regional Sea Level Rise
Human-caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to GMSL rise since 1900 (high confidence), contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800 years (medium confidence). (Ch. 12; Fig. ES.8)
Relative to the year 2000, GMSL is very likely to rise by 0.3–0.6 feet (9–18 cm) by 2030, 0.5–1.2 feet (15–38 cm) by 2050, and 1.0–4.3 feet (30–130 cm) by 2100 (very high confidence in lower bounds; medium confidence in upper bounds for 2030 and 2050; low confidence in upper bounds for 2100). Future emissions pathways have little effect on projected GMSL rise in the first half of the century, but significantly affect projections for the second half of the century (high confidence). (Ch. 12)
Figure 8
The top panel shows observed and reconstructed mean sea level for the last 2,500 years. The bottom panel shows projected mean sea level for six future scenarios. The six scenarios—spanning a range designed to inform a variety of decision makers—extend from a low scenario, consistent with continuation of the rate of sea level rise over the last quarter century, to an extreme scenario, assuming rapid mass loss from the Antarctic ice sheet. Note that the range on the vertical axis in the bottom graph is approximately ten times greater than in the top graph. Based on Figure 12.2 and 12.4 in Chapter 12. See the main report for more details.
Emerging science regarding Antarctic ice sheet stability suggests that, for higher scenarios, a GMSL rise exceeding 8 feet (2.4 m) by 2100 is physically possible, although the probability of such an extreme outcome cannot currently be assessed. Regardless of emission pathway, it is extremely likely that GMSL rise will continue beyond 2100 (high confidence). (Ch. 12)
Relative sea level rise in this century will vary along U.S. coastlines due, in part, to changes in Earth’s gravitational field and rotation from melting of land ice, changes in ocean circulation, and vertical land motion (very high confidence). For almost all future GMSL rise scenarios, relative sea level rise is likely to be greater than the global average in the U.S. Northeast and the western Gulf of Mexico. In intermediate and low GMSL rise scenarios, relative sea level rise is likely to be less than the global average in much of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. For high GMSL rise scenarios, relative sea level rise is likely to be higher than the global average along all U.S. coastlines outside Alaska. Almost all U.S. coastlines experience more than global mean sea level rise in response to Antarctic ice loss, and thus would be particularly affected under extreme GMSL rise scenarios involving substantial Antarctic mass loss (high confidence). (Ch. 12)
Coastal Flooding
Figure 9
As sea levels have risen, the number of tidal floods each year that cause minor impacts (also called “nuisance floods”) have increased 5- to 10-fold since the 1960s in several U.S. coastal cities (very high confidence). Rates of increase are accelerating in over 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities (very high confidence). Tidal flooding will continue increasing in depth, frequency, and extent this century (very high confidence). (Ch. 12)
Assuming storm characteristics do not change, sea level rise will increase the frequency and extent of extreme flooding associated with coastal storms, such as hurricanes and nor’easters (very high confidence). A projected increase in the intensity of hurricanes in the North Atlantic (medium confidence) could increase the probability of extreme flooding along most of the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coast states beyond what would be projected based solely on relative sea level rise. However, there is low confidence in the projected increase in frequency of intense Atlantic hurricanes, and the associated flood risk amplification, and flood effects could be offset or amplified by such factors, such as changes in overall storm frequency or tracks. (Ch.12; Fig. ES. 9)
Global Ocean Circulation
The potential slowing of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC; of which the Gulf Stream is one component)—as a result of increasing ocean heat content and freshwater-driven buoyancy changes—could have dramatic climate feedbacks as the ocean absorbs less heat and CO2 from the atmosphere. This slowing would also affect the climates of North America and Europe. Any slowing documented to date cannot be directly tied to human-caused forcing, primarily due to lack of adequate observational data and to challenges in modeling ocean circulation changes. Under a higher scenario (RCP8.5), models show that the AMOC weakens over the 21st century (low confidence). (Ch. 13)
Global and Regional Ocean Acidification
Higher-latitude systems typically have a lower buffering capacity against changing acidity, exhibiting seasonally corrosive conditions sooner than low-latitude systems. The rate of acidification is unparalleled in at least the past 66 million years (medium confidence). Under the higher scenario (RCP8.5), the global average surface ocean acidity is projected to increase by 100% to 150% (high confidence). (Ch. 13)
Acidification is regionally greater than the global average along U.S. coastal systems as a result of upwelling (e.g., in the Pacific Northwest) (high confidence), changes in freshwater inputs (e.g., in the Gulf of Maine) (medium confidence), and nutrient input (e.g., in urbanized estuaries) (high confidence). (Ch. 13)
Ocean Oxygen
Increasing sea surface temperatures, rising sea levels, and changing patterns of precipitation, winds, nutrients, and ocean circulation are contributing to overall declining oxygen concentrations at intermediate depths in various ocean locations and in many coastal areas. Over the last half century, major oxygen losses have occurred in inland seas, estuaries, and in the coastal and open ocean (high confidence). Ocean oxygen levels are projected to decrease by as much as 3.5% under the higher scenario (RCP8.5) by 2100 relative to preindustrial values (high confidence). (Ch. 13)
Climate Change in Alaska and across the Arctic Continues to Outpace Global Climate Change
Residents of Alaska are on the front lines of climate change. Crumbling buildings, roads, and bridges and eroding shorelines are commonplace. Accelerated melting of multiyear sea ice cover, mass loss from the Greenland Ice Sheet, reduced snow cover, and permafrost thawing are stark examples of the rapid changes occurring in the Arctic. Furthermore, because elements of the climate system are interconnected (see Box ES.1), changes in the Arctic influence climate conditions outside the Arctic.
Arctic Temperature Increases
Rising Alaskan permafrost temperatures are causing permafrost to thaw and become more discontinuous; this process releases additional carbon dioxide and methane resulting in additional warming (high confidence). The overall magnitude of the permafrost-carbon feedback is uncertain (Ch. 2); however, it is clear that these emissions have the potential to compromise the ability to limit global temperature increases. (Ch. 11)
Atmospheric circulation patterns connect the climates of the Arctic and the contiguous United States. Evidenced by recent record warm temperatures in the Arctic and emerging science, the midlatitude circulation has influenced observed arctic temperatures and sea ice (high confidence). However, confidence is low regarding whether or by what mechanisms observed arctic warming may have influenced the midlatitude circulation and weather patterns over the continental United States. The influence of arctic changes on U.S. weather over the coming decades remains an open question with the potential for significant impact. (Ch. 11)
Arctic Land Ice Loss
Arctic land ice loss observed in the last three decades continues, in some cases accelerating (very high confidence). It is virtually certain that Alaska glaciers have lost mass over the last 50 years, with each year since 1984 showing an annual average ice mass less than the previous year. Over the satellite record, average ice mass loss from Greenland was −269 Gt per year between April 2002 and April 2016, accelerating in recent years (high confidence). (Ch. 11)
Arctic Sea Ice Loss
Arctic sea ice loss is expected to continue through the 21st century, very likely resulting in nearly sea ice-free late summers by the 2040s (very high confidence). (Ch. 11)
It is very likely that human activities have contributed to observed arctic surface temperature warming, sea ice loss, glacier mass loss, and northern hemisphere snow extent decline (high confidence). (Ch. 11)
Figure 10
September sea ice extent and age shown for (top) 1984 and (middle) 2016, illustrating significant reductions in sea ice extent and age (thickness). The bar graph in the lower right of each panel illustrates the sea ice area (unit: million km2) covered within each age category (> 1 year), and the green bars represent the maximum extent for each age range during the record. The year 1984 is representative of September sea ice characteristics during the 1980s. The years 1984 and 2016 are selected as endpoints in the time series; a movie of the complete time series is available at http://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/details.cgi?aid=4489. (bottom) The satellite-era arctic sea ice areal extent trend from 1979 to 2016 for September (unit: million mi2). From Figure 11.1 in Chapter 11.
Limiting Globally Averaged Warming to 2°C (3.6°F) Will Require Major Reductions in Emissions
Human activities are now the dominant cause of the observed trends in climate. For that reason, future climate projections are based on scenarios of how human activities will continue to affect the climate over the remainder of this century and beyond (see Sidebar: Scenarios Used in this Assessment). There remains significant uncertainty about future emissions due to changing economic, political, and demographic factors. For that reason, this report quantifies possible climate changes for a broad set of plausible future scenarios through the end of the century. (Ch. 2, 4, 10, 14)
Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today (high confidence). Continued growth in CO2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of millions of years (medium confidence). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million years (medium confidence). (Ch. 4)
Warming and associated climate effects from CO2 emissions persist for decades to millennia. In the near-term, changes in climate are determined by past and present greenhouse gas emissions modified by natural variability. Reducing net emissions of CO2 is necessary to limit near-term climate change and long-term warming. Other greenhouse gases (e.g., methane) and black carbon aerosols exert stronger warming effects than CO2 on a per ton basis, but they do not persist as long in the atmosphere (Ch. 2); therefore, mitigation of non-CO2 species contributes substantially to near-term cooling benefits but cannot be relied upon for ultimate stabilization goals. (Very high confidence) (Ch. 14)
Stabilizing global mean temperature to less than 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels requires substantial reductions in net global CO2 emissions prior to 2040 relative to present-day values before 2040 and likely requires net emissions to become zero or possibly negative later in the century. After accounting for the temperature effects of non-CO2 species, cumulative global CO2 emissions must stay below about 800 GtC in order to provide a two-thirds likelihood of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming. Given estimated cumulative emissions since 1870, no more than approximately 230 GtC may be emitted in the future in order to remain under this temperature limit. Assuming global emissions are equal to or greater than those consistent with the RCP4.5 scenario, this cumulative carbon threshold would be exceeded in approximately two decades. (Ch. 14)
Achieving global greenhouse gas emissions reductions before 2030 consistent with targets and actions announced by governments in the lead up to the 2015 Paris climate conference would hold open the possibility of meeting the long-term temperature goal of limiting global warming to 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels, whereas there would be virtually no chance if net global emissions followed a pathway well above those implied by country announcements. Actions in the announcements are, by themselves, insufficient to meet a 3.6°F (2°C) goal; the likelihood of achieving that depends strongly on the magnitude of global emissions reductions after 2030. (High confidence) (Ch. 14)
Climate intervention or geoengineering strategies such as solar radiation management are measures that attempt to limit or reduce global temperature increases. Further assessments of the technical feasibilities, costs, risks, co-benefits, and governance challenges of climate intervention or geoengineering strategies, which are as yet unproven at scale, are a necessary step before judgments about the benefits and risks of these approaches can be made with high confidence. (High confidence) (Ch. 14)
In recent decades, land-use and land-cover changes have turned the terrestrial biosphere (soil and plants) into a net “sink” for carbon (drawing down carbon from the atmosphere), and this sink has steadily increased since 1980 (high confidence). Because of the uncertainty in the trajectory of land cover, the possibility of the land becoming a net carbon source cannot be excluded (very high confidence). (Ch. 10)
There is a Significant Possibility for Unanticipated Changes
Humanity’s effect on the Earth system, through the large-scale combustion of fossil fuels and widespread deforestation and the resulting release of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, as well as through emissions of other greenhouse gases and radiatively active substances from human activities, is unprecedented. There is significant potential for humanity’s effect on the planet to result in unanticipated surprises and a broad consensus that the further and faster the Earth system is pushed towards warming, the greater the risk of such surprises.
There are at least two types of potential surprises: compound events, where multiple extreme climate events occur simultaneously or sequentially (creating greater overall impact), and critical threshold or tipping pointevents, where some threshold is crossed in the climate system (that leads to large impacts). The probability of such surprises—some of which may be abrupt and/or irreversible—as well as other more predictable but difficult-to-manage impacts, increases as the influence of human activities on the climate system increases. (Ch. 15)
Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past (for example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of atmosphere or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled and quantified; others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts). (Ch. 15)
The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the parts (very high confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or temporal correlation between extreme events. (Ch. 15)
While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks (Ch. 2), compound extreme events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence). (Ch. 15)
Homeowners living in flood plain have learned the hard way that climate change has effected their ability to get a mortgage. As the sea level rises and extreme weather events intensify, homeowners have found their insurance rates increasing or their total inability to obtain insurance coverage. Without insurance it is very, very hard to get a mortgage.
Moody’s credit ratings are now going to have a similar impact on municipalities. “What we want people to realize is: If you’re exposed, we know that. We’re going to ask questions about what you’re doing to mitigate that exposure,” Lenny Jones, a managing director at Moody’s, said in an interview. “That’s taken into your credit ratings.”
Bloomberg news agency reports:
In its report, Moody’s lists six indicators it uses “to assess the exposure and overall susceptibility of U.S. states to the physical effects of climate change.” They include the share of economic activity that comes from coastal areas, hurricane and extreme-weather damage as a share of the economy, and the share of homes in a flood plain.
Based on those overall risks, Texas, Florida, Georgia and Mississippi are among the states most at risk from climate change. Moody’s didn’t identify which cities or municipalities were most exposed.
“If I was a city official, I’d be asking a whole lot of questions about what vulnerabilities their community has, and how each new proposed development adds to that vulnerability,” said Rob Moore, a senior policy analyst at the Natural Resources Defense Council. “Because at some point, your creditors certainly will.”
Your Internet service provider (ISP) knows where you live, your address and billing info. They also know:
all the IPs and domain names you visit and when
all the content of your unencrypted traffic in and out, as well as, the timing
The federal government now allows your ISP to sell the information.
VPN: Virtual Private Network
VPN stands for virtual private network. A VPN builds an encrypted connection from your computer to your VPN provider and routes all your traffic through it. All your traffic now appears on the net through the IP of your VPN provider.
If you use a VPN, the only thing others can see is you making an encrypted connection to one IP that relays your traffic. If that IP is at the same location as you, you are still subject to a geolocation threat.
In addition to using a VPN, the following is recommended:
TURN OFF Cookies And Java
The easiest way to start protecting your privacy is turning off cookies and java in your browser. Cookies allow remote servers access to your internet activities. Your browser history is also subject to privacy violations. Only allow access to your cookies and browser history when you are confident of the websites you visit. If a site forces you to use cookies, clear your cookies and browser history after each visit.
Java and Java script allow remote servers to run programs on your computer. Java script is how most malware is downloaded onto your computer. Avoid Java at all costs.
AdBlock – Chrome
Advertisement blocking software can be added to most web browsers. AdBlock for Google’s Chrome is one of the highest rated. Google says, “AdBlock. The #1 ad blocker with over 200 million downloads. Blocks YouTube, Facebook and ads everywhere else on the web. The original AdBlock for Chrome works automatically. Choose to continue seeing unobtrusive ads, whitelist your favorite sites, or block all ads by default. Just click “Add to Chrome,” then visit your favorite website and see the ads disappear!”
IP Anonymizer
Protecting the privacy of your unique IP is the most important aspect of protecting your privacy. It is also fairly difficult. A VPN does not conceal your IP on the Internet.
The easiest and cheapest way to conceal your identity is with an IP Anonymizer. “This anonymizer will hide your IP address from the websites you access as well as protect you from tracking with cookies and other means.”
You can go to a site, such as, http://webanonymizer.org/ and enter the website you want to visit. WebAnonymizer will automatically mask your IP for free.
TOR
A Tor browser is free software for enabling anonymous communication. The Tor name is an acronym for the original software project name “The Onion Router”. Tor routes Internet traffic through a free, worldwide, volunteer network of more than seven thousand relays. A users location and usage is concealed from anyone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. Tor makes it very difficult for Internet activity to be traced including “visits to Web sites, online posts, instant messages, and other communication forms”.
The Tor project states, “The Tor software protects you by bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical location, and it lets you access sites which are blocked. Tor Browser lets you use Tor on Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux without needing to install any software. It can run off a USB flash drive, comes with a pre-configured web browser to protect your anonymity, and is self-contained (portable).”
Comments
A reader asked: So is there still a place for a VPN on our mobile devices? When using public wifi for example?
A: Yes. Almost all public wifi’s are a private network. You just have to worry about the other people who are on the private network with you. A device on the private network is easily hacked by someone in close proximity (e.g. hackers can use a Pringles can as an antenna and gain access within several hundred yards http://www.lifehack.org/articles/lifehack/extend-your-wifi-range-using-diy-antenna-from-pringles-can.html)
by the Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
A grand jury in the Northern District of California has indicted four defendants, including two officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), for computer hacking, economic espionage and other criminal offenses in connection with a conspiracy, beginning in January 2014, to access Yahoo’s network and the contents of webmail accounts. The defendants are Dmitry Aleksandrovich Dokuchaev, 33, a Russian national and resident; Igor Anatolyevich Sushchin, 43, a Russian national and resident; Alexsey Alexseyevich Belan, aka “Magg,” 29, a Russian national and resident; and Karim Baratov, aka “Kay,” “Karim Taloverov” and “Karim Akehmet Tokbergenov,” 22, a Canadian and Kazakh national and a resident of Canada.
The defendants used unauthorized access to Yahoo’s systems to steal information from about at least 500 million Yahoo accounts and then used some of that stolen information to obtain unauthorized access to the contents of accounts at Yahoo, Google and other webmail providers, including accounts of Russian journalists, U.S. and Russian government officials and private-sector employees of financial, transportation and other companies. One of the defendants also exploited his access to Yahoo’s network for his personal financial gain, by searching Yahoo user communications for credit card and gift card account numbers, redirecting a subset of Yahoo search engine web traffic so he could make commissions and enabling the theft of the contacts of at least 30 million Yahoo accounts to facilitate a spam campaign.
The charges were announced by Attorney General Jeff Sessions of the U.S. Department of Justice, Director James Comey of the FBI, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mary McCord of the National Security Division, U.S. Attorney Brian Stretch for the Northern District of California and Executive Assistant Director Paul Abbate of the FBI’s Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch.
“Cyber crime poses a significant threat to our nation’s security and prosperity, and this is one of the largest data breaches in history,” said Attorney General Sessions. “But thanks to the tireless efforts of U.S. prosecutors and investigators, as well as our Canadian partners, today we have identified four individuals, including two Russian FSB officers, responsible for unauthorized access to millions of users’ accounts. The United States will vigorously investigate and prosecute the people behind such attacks to the fullest extent of the law.”
“Today we continue to pierce the veil of anonymity surrounding cyber crimes,” said Director Comey. “We are shrinking the world to ensure that cyber criminals think twice before targeting U.S. persons and interests.”
“ The criminal conduct at issue, carried out and otherwise facilitated by officers from an FSB unit that serves as the FBI’s point of contact in Moscow on cybercrime matters, is beyond the pale,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General McCord. “Once again, the Department and the FBI have demonstrated that hackers around the world can and will be exposed and held accountable. State actors may be using common criminals to access the data they want, but the indictment shows that our companies do not have to stand alone against this threat. We commend Yahoo and Google for their sustained and invaluable cooperation in the investigation aimed at obtaining justice for, and protecting the privacy of their users.”
“This is a highly complicated investigation of a very complex threat. It underscores the value of early, proactive engagement and cooperation between the private sector and the government,” said Executive Assistant Director Abbate. “The FBI will continue to work relentlessly with our private sector and international partners to identify those who conduct cyber-attacks against our citizens and our nation, expose them and hold them accountable under the law, no matter where they attempt to hide.”
“Silicon Valley’s computer infrastructure provides the means by which people around the world communicate with each other in their business and personal lives. The privacy and security of those communications must be governed by the rule of law, not by the whim of criminal hackers and those who employ them. People rightly expect that their communications through Silicon Valley internet providers will remain private, unless lawful authority provides otherwise. We will not tolerate unauthorized and illegal intrusions into the Silicon Valley computer infrastructure upon which both private citizens and the global economy rely,” said U.S. Attorney Stretch. “Working closely with Yahoo and Google, Department of Justice lawyers and the FBI were able to identify and expose the hackers responsible for the conduct described today, without unduly intruding into the privacy of the accounts that were stolen. We commend Yahoo and Google for providing exemplary cooperation while zealously protecting their users’ privacy.”
Summary of Allegations
According to the allegations of the Indictment:
The FSB officer defendants, Dmitry Dokuchaev and Igor Sushchin, protected, directed, facilitated and paid criminal hackers to collect information through computer intrusions in the U.S. and elsewhere. In the present case, they worked with co-defendants Alexsey Belan and Karim Baratov to obtain access to the email accounts of thousands of individuals.
Belan had been publicly indicted in September 2012 and June 2013 and was named one of FBI’s Cyber Most Wanted criminals in November 2013. An Interpol Red Notice seeking his immediate detention has been lodged (including with Russia) since July 26, 2013. Belan was arrested in a European country on a request from the U.S. in June 2013, but he was able to escape to Russia before he could be extradited.
Instead of acting on the U.S. government’s Red Notice and detaining Belan after his return, Dokuchaev and Sushchin subsequently used him to gain unauthorized access to Yahoo’s network. In or around November and December 2014, Belan stole a copy of at least a portion of Yahoo’s User Database (UDB), a Yahoo trade secret that contained, among other data, subscriber information including users’ names, recovery email accounts, phone numbers and certain information required to manually create, or “mint,” account authentication web browser “cookies” for more than 500 million Yahoo accounts.
Belan also obtained unauthorized access on behalf of the FSB conspirators to Yahoo’s Account Management Tool (AMT), which was a proprietary means by which Yahoo made and logged changes to user accounts. Belan, Dokuchaev and Sushchin then used the stolen UDB copy and AMT access to locate Yahoo email accounts of interest and to mint cookies for those accounts, enabling the co-conspirators to access at least 6,500 such accounts without authorization.
Some victim accounts were of predictable interest to the FSB, a foreign intelligence and law enforcement service, such as personal accounts belonging to Russian journalists; Russian and U.S. government officials; employees of a prominent Russian cybersecurity company; and numerous employees of other providers whose networks the conspirators sought to exploit. However, other personal accounts belonged to employees of commercial entities, such as a Russian investment banking firm, a French transportation company, U.S. financial services and private equity firms, a Swiss bitcoin wallet and banking firm and a U.S. airline.
During the conspiracy, the FSB officers facilitated Belan’s other criminal activities, by providing him with sensitive FSB law enforcement and intelligence information that would have helped him avoid detection by U.S. and other law enforcement agencies outside Russia, including information regarding FSB investigations of computer hacking and FSB techniques for identifying criminal hackers. Additionally, while working with his FSB conspirators to compromise Yahoo’s network and its users, Belan used his access to steal financial information such as gift card and credit card numbers from webmail accounts; to gain access to more than 30 million accounts whose contacts were then stolen to facilitate a spam campaign; and to earn commissions from fraudulently redirecting a subset of Yahoo’s search engine traffic.
When Dokuchaev and Sushchin learned that a target of interest had accounts at webmail providers other than Yahoo, including through information obtained as part of the Yahoo intrusion, they tasked their co-conspirator, Baratov, a resident of Canada, with obtaining unauthorized access to more than 80 accounts in exchange for commissions. On March 7, the Department of Justice submitted a provisional arrest warrant to Canadian law enforcement authorities, requesting Baratov’s arrest. On March 14, Baratov was arrested in Canada and the matter is now pending with the Canadian authorities.
An indictment is merely an accusation, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law.
The FBI, led by the San Francisco Field Office, conducted the investigation that resulted in the charges announced today. The case is being prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, with support from the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.
Defendants: At all times relevant to the charges, the Indictment alleges as follows:
Dmitry Aleksandrovich Dokuchaev, 33, was an officer in the FSB Center for Information Security, aka “Center 18.” Dokuchaev was a Russian national and resident.
Igor Anatolyevich Sushchin, 43, was an FSB officer, a superior to Dokuchaev within the FSB, and a Russian national and resident. Sushchin was embedded as a purported employee and Head of Information Security at a Russian investment bank.
Alexsey Alexseyevich Belan, aka “Magg,” 29, was born in Latvia and is a Russian national and resident. U.S. Federal grand juries have indicted Belan twice before, in 2012 and 2013, for computer fraud and abuse, access device fraud and aggravated identity theft involving three U.S.-based e-commerce companies and the FBI placed Belan on its “Cyber Most Wanted” list. Belan is currently the subject of a pending “Red Notice” requesting that Interpol member nations (including Russia) arrest him pending extradition. Belan was also one of two criminal hackers named by President Barack Obama on Dec. 29, 2016, pursuant to Executive Order 13694, as a Specially Designated National subject to sanctions.
Karim Baratov, aka “Kay,” “Karim Taloverov” and “Karim Akehmet Tokbergenov,” 22. He is a Canadian and Kazakh national and a resident of Canada.
Victims: Yahoo; more than 500 million Yahoo accounts for which account information about was stolen by the defendants; more than 30 million Yahoo accounts for which account contents were accessed without authorization to facilitate a spam campaign; and at least 18 additional users at other webmail providers whose accounts were accessed without authorization.
Time Period: As alleged in the Indictment, the conspiracy began at least as early as 2014 and, even though the conspirators lost their access to Yahoo’s networks in September 2016, they continued to utilize information stolen from the intrusion up to and including at least December 2016.
Crimes:
Count(s)
Defendant(s)
Charge
Statute 18 U.S.C.
Conduct
Maximum Penalty
1
All
Conspiring to commit computer fraud and abuse
§ 1030(b)
Defendants conspired to hack into the computers of Yahoo and accounts maintained by Yahoo, Google and other providers to steal information from them.
First, Belan gained access to Yahoo’s servers and stole information that allowed him, Dokuchaev, and Sushchin to gain unauthorized access to individual Yahoo user accounts.
Then, Dokuchaev and Sushchin tasked Baratov with gaining access to individual user accounts at Google and other Providers (but not Yahoo) and paid Baratov for providing them with the account passwords. In some instances, Dokuchaev and Sushchin tasked Baratov with targeting accounts that they learned of through access to Yahoo’s UDB and AMT (e.g., Gmail accounts that served as a Yahoo user’s secondary account).
10 years
2
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Conspiring to engage in economic espionage
§ 1831(a)(5)
Starting on Nov. 4, 2014, Belan stole, and the defendants thereafter transferred, received and possessed the following Yahoo trade secrets:
the Yahoo UDB, which was proprietary and confidential Yahoo technology and information, including subscriber names, secondary accounts, phone numbers, challenge questions and answers;
the AMT, Yahoo’s interface to the UDB; and
Yahoo’s cookie “minting” source code, which enabled the defendants to manufacture account cookies to then gain access to individual Yahoo user accounts.
15 years
3
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Conspiring to engage in theft of trade secrets
§ 1832(a)(5)
See Count 2
10 years
4-6
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Economic espionage
§§ 1831(a)(1), (a)(4), and 2
See Count 2
15 years (each count)
7-9
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Theft of trade secrets
§§ 1832(a)(1), and 2
See Count 2
10 years (each count)
10
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Conspiring to commit wire fraud
§ 1349
The defendants fraudulently schemed to gain unauthorized access to Yahoo’s network through compromised Yahoo employee accounts and then used the Yahoo trade secrets to gain unauthorized access to valuable non-public information in individual Yahoo user accounts.
20 years
11-13
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Accessing (or attempting to access) a computer without authorization to obtain information for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain.
§§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), and 2
The defendants gained unauthorized access to Yahoo’s corporate network and obtained information regarding Yahoo’s network architecture and the UDB.
5 years
(each count)
14-17
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Transmitting code with the intent to cause damage to computers.
§§ 1030(a)(5)(A), 1030(c)(4)(B), and 2
During the course of their unauthorized access to Yahoo’s network, the defendants transmitted code on Yahoo’s network in order to maintain a persistent presence, to redirect Yahoo search engine users and to mint cookies for individual Yahoo accounts.
10 years (each count)
18-24
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Accessing (or attempting to access) a computer without authorization to obtain information for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain.
§§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), and 2
Defendants obtained unauthorized access to individual Yahoo user accounts.
5 years
(each count)
25-36
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Counterfeit access device fraud
§§ 1029(a)(1), 1029(b)(1), and 2
Defendants used minted cookies to gain unauthorized access to individual Yahoo user accounts.
10 years (each count)
37
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Belan
Counterfeit access device making equipment
§§ 1029(a)(4)
Defendants used software to mint cookies for unauthorized access to individual Yahoo user accounts.
15 years
38
Dokuchaev
Sushchin
Baratov
Conspiring to commit access device fraud
§§ 1029(b)(2)
Defendants Dokuchaev and Sushchin tasked Baratov with gaining unauthorized access to individual user accounts at Google and other Providers and then paid Baratov for providing them with the account passwords. In some instances, Dokuchaev and Sushchin tasked Baratov with targeting accounts that they learned of through access to Yahoo’s UDB and AMT (e.g., Gmail accounts that served as a Yahoo user’s secondary account).
Q: Who pays for flood insurance?
A: The United States government, FEMA, covers losses for people that pay flood insurance premiums.
Q: Does your homeowners insurance policy cover you in the event of flooding?
A: No.
Flood insurance coverage is very limited. For instance, basements and belonging in a basement are not covered. Life-time coverage is also limited. If a property has a pay-out in the past, it will be applied to the maximum coverage of the life-time coverage.
As climate change causes extreme weather events and the sea level to rise, houses that are prone to flooding will find it harder and harder to get flood insurance. Without flood insurance, properties located in a flood plain become almost impossible to sell.
For years, the casinos in Atlantic City, NJ have had a plan to float the casinos and move them westward as the sea level rises. Shipping ports face a similar problem, but how can you move a port inland? Coastal areas will need to start a constant and progressive movement to higher ground.
Freddie Mac mortgage says, “Insurance is an essential component of real estate transactions, and flood insurance currently makes it possible to obtain loans for homes in areas of identified flood risk. However, some of the varied impacts of climate change—rising sea levels, changing rainfall and flooding patterns, increasing temperatures—may not be insurable. As a result, some important features of housing finance may have to change. The potential impact of these systemic changes on the financial system is difficult to visualize today.” (More from this article.)
EARTH — Imagine a group of radical Christians taking over the government and trying to bring on the Rapture (aka The Apocalypse) and the Second Coming.
You no longer need to imagine. A conspiracy of Evangelical Christians are trying to facilitate The End Of Times. They want to fulfill biblical prophecies including:
The Revival of the Roman Empire
The Emergence of the Antichrist
The Covenant with Israel
Three Periods Between the Rapture and the Second Coming
The War with Russia
The Great Tribulation: Armageddon
The Radical Christian Terrorists believe they will be “saved” when these events occur.
ESCHATOLOGY
Eschatology is the part of theology concerned with death, judgment, and the final destiny of the soul and of humankind.
THE RAPTURE / ZOMBIE APOCALYPSE Daniel 12
The Time of the End
2 Many of those who are dead in the ground will awake, these to everlasting life, but the others to disgrace and everlasting contempt.
Thessalonians 4:17
17 Then we who are alive and remain will be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and so we shall always be with the Lord.
In Christian eschatology, the Rapture refers to the prophesied event when “Christian believers who have died will be raised and believers who are still alive and remain shall be caught up together with them (the resurrected dead believers) in the clouds to meet the Lord Jesus Christ in the air.”
APOCALYPSE
The apocalypse is the complete and final destruction of the world as prophesied in the biblical books of Daniel and Revelation (the last book of the Bible.)
The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse in the book of Revelation are horsemen on white, red, black, and pale horses. The riders are often seen as symbolizing:
Conquest, Pestilence, the Christ or the Antichrist
War
Famine
Death
“The Christian apocalyptic vision is that the four horsemen are to set a divine apocalypse upon the world as harbingers of the Last Judgment.”
Revelation 6:7-8
When the Lamb broke the fourth seal, I heard the voice of the fourth living creature saying, “Come.” I looked, and behold, an ashen (pale) horse; and he who sat on it had the name Death; and Hades was following with him. Authority was given to them over a fourth of the earth, to kill with sword and with famine and with pestilence and by the wild beasts of the earth.
The first seal is broken and the first of the four living creatures introduces a white horse whose crowned rider, equipped with a bow, goes out to conquer.
The second seal is broken and the second of the four living creatures introduces a red horse, whose rider wields a great sword.
The third seal is broken and the third of the four living creatures introduces a black horse, whose rider carries a pair of scales, goes out.
The fourth seal is broken and the fourth of the four living creatures introduces an ashen horse comes out, whose rider has the name Death and Hades follows him.
The fifth seal is broken revealing the souls of those who had been slain for the “Word of God”.
The sixth seal is broken “and there was a great earthquake; and the sun became black as sackcloth made of hair, and the whole moon became like blood; and the stars of the sky fell to the earth, The sky was split apart, every mountain and island were moved out of their places.”
Mankind hides themselves in the caves and mountains acknowledging the presence of Him who sits on the throne and the wrath of the Lamb.
Protectionism is the theory or practice of shielding a country’s domestic industries from foreign competition by restricting imports. There are no known benefits to protectionism. The costs of protectionism include being financially destructive, negatively impacting health and wellness, as well as, causing death. (also see: Trade War! What Is It Good For?)
Following are a few examples:
GOLDEN RICE AND THE TRANS PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
Trade restrictions are often put on agricultural products in an effort for a country to protect its farmers. The result is to harm the general population. Rice is a good example of a crop that is widely protected by trade restrictions. USA Rice states, “The barriers range from ongoing phytosanitary restrictions by Colombia on imports of U.S. paddy rice; a discriminatory and very complex tariff regime in the EU; the trade distorting impact of Thailand’s rice support program; government management of rice imports in Japan and Taiwan; and Korea’s new rice import regime.”
The United States Patent and Trademark Office stated, “Despite current interventions, vitamin A deficiency is the leading killer of children globally (2-3 million annually) and also the leading cause of childhood blindness (500,000 cases annually). Most cases arise in Asia where the staple food eaten by 3.5 billion people daily, white rice, lacks vitamin A sources typically found in meat and leafy vegetables. These deaths and blindness are preventable.”
In 2015, Golden Rice won a humanitarian award. Not only is Golden Rice more nutritious than white rice, it is also less harmful to the environment (since less of it needs to be grown.) There are numerous health benefits from Golden Rice including β-Carotene that provides vitamin A to children. It is estimated that millions of children’s lives could be saved and childhood blindness could be dramatically reduced.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) would have eliminated trade restrictions on Golden Rice by the participating countries.
1930 SMOOT-HAWLEY TARIFF ACT
The Tariff Act of 1930 was signed into law on June 17, 1930 by President Herbert Hoover. The act raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported products. The tariffs imposed an effective tax rate of 60% on many of the goods. The Act also started a trade war with America’s trading partners resulting in reduced American exports and imports by more than 50% contributing to The Great Depression.
Historians estimate at least 3 million civilians died from the Great Depression in the United States, mostly young children, the elderly and women. The main causes were:
malnutrition
infectious disease
attempted child birth
starvation
suicide
THE SHOE TAX
The shoe tax is a remnant of the Smoot–Hawley Act. United States’ shoe tariffs are 10 times higher than the average U.S. tariff rate. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, in 2011 shoes accounted for 1 percent of merchandise imports, but provided 7.9 percent of U.S. tariff revenue.
Regressive taxes disproportionately hurt the poor. A regressive tax “imposes a greater burden (relative to resources) on the poor than on the rich.” The money paid in taxes has a larger impact on the ability of lower-income households to satisfy their basic needs, like food, clothing, healthcare and shelter.
PHARMACEUTICAL TARIFFS
In 2006 the WTO said scrapping the tariffs on medicines and drug ingredients would result in “effective action to improve access to medicines and medical devices needed to treat a wide variety of diseases effectively and ensure that these goods reach patients expeditiously at a lower cost.”
“It is ironic that many of the countries that are in urgent need of cheap medicines also have a significant tax added to drugs and medical devices they import,” said Peter Allgeier, the US ambassador to the WTO.
The National Institute of Health stated:
A group of countries, including members of the European Union, Canada, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Norway, agreed to eliminate import tariffs on thousands of finished drugs and intermediate ingredients in the Uruguay round trade talks between 1986 and 1994. As a result, out of an average global trade in drugs worth $145bn between 1999 and 2001, $114bn was covered by the initiative. But almost $33bn is still subject to duty, the joint proposal noted.
AL-SHIFA PHARMACEUTICAL FACTORY
Operation Infinite Reach was the codename for an American cruise missile strike on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. After helping Sudan build a pharmaceutical factory, the United States blew it up. Initially, the U.S. claimed the plant was making chemical weapons. Eventually, the U.S. admitted there was no evidence the plant was making chemical weapons. The side-effects to the local population included:
no supplies of chloroquine (the standard treatment for malaria)
relief workers fleeing the country resulting in starvation
fostering the attack of 9/11
The trade disruption is estimated to have killed or maimed hundreds of thousands of people many of which were children.
BABY FORMULA IN CHINA
For years China had stiff tariffs on imported baby formula. The lack of competition forced the price higher and the quality lower. In 2012, China’s consumer quality regulator found an “unusual amount” of mercury in baby formula produced by Yili Industrial Group Co. “At present, the country has no standards on mercury limits in milk powder. But to be responsible to consumers, the company decided to recall all related products,” said the company.
It is unclear how many children have been malnourished or poisoned due to China’s trade policy. Under free-trade agreements, such as the TPP, countries can not put tariffs on the product and the product must meet the health and safety standards of the USA.
International Economics 101
What do you think of when you hear the term “trade war”?
The costs and benefits to society are very similar to traditional warfare.
1) Financial Cost. A war is expensive. In a trade war, huge tariffs are placed on the purchase of imports. A tariff is a sales tax paid for by the citizen. Quite often this tax can be as high as 45% or the product even banned altogether. The tax is paid by the citizen to their government. The financial loss from the in-efficiency of paying large taxes is a tremendous burden on the country’s own citizens. In addition, there are usually large costs to the private sector. These costs can include high interest rates, inflation and loss of value to liquid assets. The standard of living declines.
2) Casualties / Loss Of Life. Millions of people are maimed or die in a trade war. The easiest examples in recent history would be the impacts on baby formula or pharmaceuticals. Hundreds-of-thousands of children, as well as, adults in need of medication died because these items were targeted in trade wars. Another example is maiming children by targeting vitamin A (causing childhood blindness.) Typically, trade wars impact the most vulnerable first — babies, the sick and the elderly.
